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PRIVATE PARTY CLEANUP: CONSISTENCY UNDER 
THE 1990 NATIONAL CONTINGENCY PLAN 
Jeffrey W. Pusch' 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Suppose a current owner of real property contaminated by haz-
ardous substances must clean up the property to sell it. In an attempt 
to recover its cleanup costs, the current owner likely would consider 
suing the former owner thought to be responsible for the contami-
nation. Assuming the former property owner indeed is responsible 
for the contamination, is the current owner likely to obtain reim-
bursement for the cleanup costs? The answer for such a landowner 
now is more optimistic than ever, provided this landowner acts 
pursuant to changes in the National Contingency Plan (NCP),l one 
of the major regulations related to the the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CER-
CLA).2 
Congress passed CERCLA to address hazardous waste contami-
nation in the United States.3 The United States Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) initially received $1.6 billion to respond to 
hazardous substances releases and administer the cleanup of 400 
• Business Editor, 1991-1992, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 The National Contingency Plan (NCP) establishes standards for the assessment of cleanup 
actions. National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R § 300 
(1990); see, e.g., Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1291-92 (D. 
Del. 1985), a/I'd, 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1988) (cleanup actions are to be taken within guidelines 
of NCP). 
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988). This Comment will refer to CERCLA and the Superfund 
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) collectively as CERCLA. 
3 H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 79 (1986), reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835,2836 (reviewing history of CERCLA in report on SARA); see also H.R. 
REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 22 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6119, 6125 (legislative history of CERCLA). 
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hazardous waste sites.4 Hazardous waste contamination, however, 
is much more widespread than Congress originally thought. 5 In 1985, 
the federal Office of Technology Assessment estimated that there 
were as many as 10,000 potential Superfund sites in the United 
States. 6 Cleanup of these sites will cost close to $100 billion and last 
into the coming decades. 7 Subsequent to CERCLA's passage in 1980, 
Congress passed the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization 
Act of 1986 (SARA), which further attempts to confront the reality 
of widespread hazardous waste contamination in the United States.8 
Because the EPA does not possess sufficient resources to undertake 
cleanup of all hazardous waste sites, one of the underlying principles 
of SARA is to facilitate the cleanup of these sites by responsible 
parties. 9 
This Comment discusses one aspect of CERCLA that is essential 
to promoting hazardous waste cleanup, the statutory provision 
granting private parties the ability to recover their cleanup costs 
from other responsible parties. In particular, this Comment assesses 
private parties' incentive to undertake voluntary hazardous waste 
cleanup actions given post-SARA changes to the standard governing 
private party compliance with NCP guidelines in such actions. Sec-
tion II discusses CERCLA's private cause of action for cleanup 
costs. lO Section III outlines the development of the NCP from 1968 
to 1985 and the judicial standard of conformance with the 1985 NCP 
for private party cleanup actions. 11 Section IV then discusses SARA 
and its effect on the formulation of the 1990 NCP.12 These recent 
changes in the NCP provide new incentives for private party cleanup 
of hazardous waste sites, not because they offer dramatic new lati-
tude in private party efforts, but simply because they clarify the 
standard for assessing private party obligations under the NCP and 
thereby decrease defendants' ability to use judicial disagreement 
surrounding private parties' duties under the NCP to their advan-
tage. 
4 H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 79 (1986), reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2836. 
5 Id. at 79, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2837. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 
1613 (1986). 
9 H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 79 (1986), reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2837. 
10 See infra notes 13-64 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes 65-120 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 121-154 and accompanying text. 
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II. CERCLA 
A. Potentially Responsible Parties and Liability 
Through enacting CERCLA, Congress intended to establish a 
means for addressing the array of problems associated with hazard-
ous waste disposal sites. 13 Accordingly, CERCLA imposes a wide 
net of liability.14 A release or threatened release of a hazardous 
substance at a facility triggers CERCLA liability.15 CERCLA 
broadly defines the terms "hazardous substance,"16 "facilitY,"17 and 
"release."18 A facility includes any site or area where a hazardous 
substance is located. 19 A release includes any spilling, leaking, emit-
ting, escaping, or dumping of hazardous substances into the envi-
ronment. 20 Persons in charge of facilities must notify the National 
Response Center as soon as they know of a release. 21 Failure to 
notify can result in both a fine and prison sentence. 22 
Potentially responsible parties (PRPs) may be liable for govern-
mental and private party response costS. 23 Response costs are those 
costs incurred to remove or remediate a release, or prevent a threat-
ened release, of a hazardous substance. 24 Under CERCLA, PRPs 
include members of four broad groups: current owners and operators 
of a facility; any person who owned or operated a facility at the time 
of the hazardous substance disposal; any person who arranged for 
the disposal, treatment, or transport of the hazardous substance; 
and any person who transported the hazardous substance. 25 
CERCLA is a strict liability statute, allowing only a limited num-
ber of defenses that the Act narrowly defines. 26 To qualify for one 
13 H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 22 (1980), reprinted in 1980 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6125; see also Amland Properties Corp. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 711 F. 
Supp. 784, 789 (D. N.J. 1989) ("the overarching goal of CERCLA is to place the financial cost 
of the cleanup upon those parties responsible for creating the hazardous condition"). 
14 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). 
15 ld. § 9604(a)(I). 
16 ld. § 9601(14). 
17 ld. § 9601(9). 
18 ld. § 9601(22). 
19 ld. § 9601(9). 
20 ld. § 9601(22). 
21 ld. § 9603(a). 
22 ld. § 9603(b). 
23 ld. § 9607(a)(4)(AHC). Unlike the federal government, a state, or an Indian tribe, 
private parties may not recover for natural resource damages. See id. at § 9607(0. 
24 ld. § 9601(23H25). 
25 ld. § 9607(a)(IH4). 
26 See id. § 9607(b); see also United States v. Aceto Agric. Chern. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 
1377-78 (8th Cir. 1989); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985). 
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of these affirmative defenses, a responsible party must demonstrate, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the release of a hazardous 
substance and the resulting damage were caused by an "act of God," 
an act of war, or an act or omission by a third party.27 A responsible 
party may not qualify for the third-party defense if the third party 
is an employee or agent of the responsible party, or if the act or 
omission of the third party occurred while the third party maintained 
a contractual relationship, directly or indirectly, with the responsible 
party.28 The third-party defense is also unavailable unless a respon-
sible party exercised due care with the hazardous substances and 
took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of third par-
ties. 29 
B. The Private Cause of Action Under CERCLA 
CERCLA allows private parties to clean up hazardous waste sites 
and then recover certain cleanup costs from other liable parties. 30 
According to the statute, private parties may recover "necessary" 
response costs that are "consistent" with the NCP.31 
It was initially unclear whether private parties had a cause of 
action to recover cleanup costs under CERCLA.32 Courts and com-
mentators have blamed this confusion on the speed with which Con-
In private party actions, some courts have stated that § 9607(b)'s statutory defenses are not 
exclusive. See, e.g., Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 600 F. Supp. 1049, 1058 (D. Ariz. 
1984), aff'd on other grounds, 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986) (equitable defense of unclean 
hands under CERCLA applicable in private party action). But see General Elec. Co. v. Litton 
Business Sys., 715 F. Supp. 949, 958 (W.D. Mo. 1989), aJJ'd, 920 F.2d 1415 (8th Cir. 1990), 
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1390 (1991) (defense of unclean hands not applicable in private party 
action under CERCLA). 
'2:1 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(1)-(3) (1988). 
28 ld. § 9601(35) (SARA defines contractual relationship to include subsequent owners in 
title). 
29 ld. § 9607(b)(3). 
30 ld. § 9607(a)(4)(B). The statute states that "covered persons"-PRPs-shall be liable for 
"any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the 
national contingency plan." ld.; see also Amland Properties Corp. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 
711 F. Supp. 784, 790 (D. N.J. 1989). The court stated that the following five elements comprise 
a private party claim for cost recovery under § 9607(a)(4)(B): a claimant must fall within one 
of the four categories of "covered persons;" there must have been a release or threatened 
release at a facility; the release or threatened release must have caused the claimant to incur 
costs; the costs must be "necessary costs of response;" and the claimant's response actions 
must have been consistent with the National Contingency Plan. ld. 
31 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988). 
32 See Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle County, 851 F.2d 643,648 (3d Cir. 1988); Frederic 
M. Mauhs, Judicial Limitations on the CERCLA Private Right oj Action, 15 ENVTL. L. 471, 
475 (1985). 
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gress drafted and passed the final bill. 33 Indeed, the haste of the 
bipartisan Congressional leadership group in assembling, introduc-
ing, and passing CERCLA precluded the development of an exten-
sive legislative history.34 A number of defendants have challenged 
the availability of a private cause of action under CERCLA, but 
courts have concluded that CERCLA allows a private cause of action 
for the recovery of hazardous waste cleanup costS. 35 In reaching this 
conclusion, these courts have looked both to the plain language of 
CERCLA and the statute's remedial purpose. 36 A private cause of 
action therefore is now firmly established. 37 
C. Consistency in Removal and Remedial Actions 
CERCLA divides hazardous waste cleanups, or "responses,"38 into 
two categories, "removal"39 actions and "remedial" actions.40 Re-
moval actions address immediate threats to the public welfare or the 
environment and are utilized primarily for short-term abatement of 
33 See Artesian Water Co., 851 F.2d at 648. Precipitous passage perhaps explains the 
"unartful drafting and numerous ambiguities that characterize CERCLA's provisions." Id.; 
Mauhs, supra note 32, at 475. 
34 Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response 
Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980,8 COLUMBIA J. ENVTL. L. 1, 1 (1982). 
35 See Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle County, 605 F. Supp. 1348, 1356 (D. Del. 1985), 
aff'd, 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1988); Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311,318 (6th Cir. 
1985); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1041-42 (2d Cir. 1985); Homart Dev. 
Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1357, 1358 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Pinole 
Point Properties, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F. Supp. 283, 288 (N.D. Cal. 1984); 
Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425, 1428 (S.D. Ohio 1984). 
36 See, e.g., Walls, 761 F.2d at 318; Jones, 584 F. Supp. at 1428; see also Jeffrey M. Gaba, 
Recovering Hazardous Waste Cleanup Cost: The Private Cause of Action Under CERCLA, 
13 ECOLOGY L.Q. 181, 196 (1986) (discussion of courts' analysis of issue of whether CERCLA 
created private cause of action). 
37 Gaba, supra note 36, at 196; see also Channel Master Satellite Sys., Inc. v. JFD Elec. 
Corp., 748 F. Supp. 373 (E.D.N.C. 1990). SARA added that "any person may seek contribution 
from any other person who is liable or potentially liable." 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (1988). 
38 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25), as amended by SARA, defines "respond" or "response" to mean 
remove, removal, remedy, and remedial action. Id. All such terms, including "removal" action 
and "remedial action," encompass the enforcement activities related to the actions. Id. 
A significant development under this approach to defining "response" is that some courts 
have allowed private parties to recover attorneys' fees incurred in CERCLA cost recovery 
litigation. See, e.g., Pease & Curren Refining Inc., v. Spectrolab, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 945, 949-
50 (C.D. Cal. 1990); Shapiro v. Alexanderson, 741 F. Supp. 472, 480 (S.D.N. Y. 1990); General 
Elec. Co. v. Litton Business Sys., 715 F. Supp. 949, 963-64 (W.D. Mo. 1989), aff'd, 920 F.2d 
1415 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1390 (1991). But see, e.g., United States v. 
Hardage, 750 F. Supp. 1460, 1511 (W.D. Okla. 1990); Mesiti v. Microdot Inc., 739 F. Supp. 
57,62-63 (D.N.H. 1990); Regan v. Cherry Corp., 706 F. Supp. 145, 149 (D.R.I. 1989). 
39 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (1988). 
40 I d. § 9601(24). 
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toxic waste hazards. 41 Remedial actions supplement or replace re-
moval actions and are long-term or permanent remedies.42 This dis-
tinction is significant, because parties seeking to recover costs for 
removal actions need only comply with relatively simple NCP guide-
lines. 43 Those pursuing remedial costs, however, must follow more 
detailed procedural and substantive NCP requirements. 44 
The NCP sets forth both criteria for assessing the appropriate 
extent of a removal action and an illustrative list of generally ac-
ceptable removal actions. 45 The following factors regarding the site 
of a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance must be 
considered in evaluating the appropriate extent of a removal action 
41 [d. § 9601(23). This section provides that 
[d. 
[t]he terms "remove" or "removal" means [sic] the cleanup or removal of released 
hazardous substances from the environment, such actions as may be necessary taken 
in the event of the threat of release of hazardous substances into the environment, 
such actions as may be necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or 
threat of release of hazardous substances, the disposal of removed material, or the 
taking of such other actions as may be necessary to prevent, minimize, to mitigate 
damage to the public health or welfare or to the environment, which may otherwise 
result from a release or threat of release. The term includes, in addition, without 
being limited to, security fencing or other measures to limit access, provision of 
alternative water supplies, temporary evacuation and housing of threatened individ-
uals not otherwise provided for, action taken under section 9604(b) ... and any 
emergency assistance which may be provided under the Disaster Relief Act and 
Emergency Assistance Act. 
42 See id. § 9601(24). This section provides that 
[d. 
[t]he term "remedy" or "remedial action" means those actions consistent with per-
manent remedy taken instead of or in addition to removal actions in the event of a 
release or threatened release of a hazardous substance into the environment, to 
prevent or minimize the release of hazardous substances so that they do not migrate 
to cause substantial danger to present or future public health or welfare or the 
environment. The term includes, but is not limited to, such actions at the location of 
the release as storage, confinement, perimeter protection using dikes, trenches, or 
ditches, clay cover, neutralization, cleanup of released hazardous substances and 
associated contaminated materials, recycling or reuse, diversion, destruction, seg-
regation of reactive wastes, dredging or excavations, repair or replacement of leaking 
containers, collection of leachate and runoff, onsite treatment or incineration, pro-
vision of alternative water supplies, and any monitoring reasonably required to assure 
that such actions protect the public health and welfare and the environment. 
43 See Amland Properties Corp. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 711 F. Supp. 784, 795 (D.N.J. 
1988) (citing 1985 NCP); see also National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency 
Plan, 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.410-.415 (1990) (current NCP removal guidelines). 
44 See Amland, 711 F. Supp. at 795 (citing 1985 NCP); see also National Oil and Hazardous 
Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.420-.435 (1990) (current NCP re-
medial guidelines). 
45 National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.415-
.435 (1990). 
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at the site: the actual or potential exposure of nearby human or 
animal populations or the food chain to the substances; the actual or 
potential contamination of drinking water; the presence of hazardous 
substances in containers that pose a threat of release; the presence 
of hazardous substances, at the surface, that may migrate; weather 
conditions that may cause hazardous substances to migrate; and the 
threat of fire, explosion, or other situations that may pose threats 
to public health or welfare or the environment. 46 
As a general rule, appropriate removal actions include the instal-
lation of fences, warning signs, and security control devices where 
humans or animals have access to the site of release; the implemen-
tation of drainage control where there is a need to reduce hazardous 
substance migration; the stabilization of berms, dikes, and impound-
ments, and the drainage of lagoons, to maintain the structures' 
integrity; the capping of contaminated soils and sludges to reduce 
any migration of hazardous substances; the use of chemicals and 
other materials to slow the spread of a release; the removal of highly 
contaminated soils from drainage areas; the removal of drums, bar-
rels, and tanks containing hazardous substances, to reduce the like-
lihood of spillage or exposure; the containment, treatment, disposal, 
or incineration of hazardous materials, to reduce the likelihood of 
exposure; and the provision of alternative water supplies, to reduce 
exposure to contaminated household water. 47 
Unlike a removal action, a remedial action is subject to detailed 
NCP requirements.48 These include a remedial preliminary assess-
ment (PA)49 and site inspection (SI);50 a remedial investigation/fea-
sibility study (RIIFS);51 and a remedial design/remedial action (RDI 
RA)52 evaluation. A remedial P A consists of a review of existing 
information regarding a release. 53 If the remedial PA establishes 
that a removal action is appropriate, then such an action should be 
initiated. 54 Otherwise, a remedial SI follows and builds upon the 
information collected in the remedial P A through sampling and other 
investigatory efforts. 55 An RIIFS then assesses the site, as well as 
46 Id. § 300.415(b)(2)(iHviii). 
47 Id. § 300.415(d)(lH9). 
48 Id. § 300.420-.435. 
49 Id. § 300.420. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. § 300.430. 
52 Id. § 300.435. 
63 Id. § 300.420 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
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evaluates appropriate remedial alternatives. 56 Finally, the RD/RA 
actually develops and implements the remedy for the site. 57 
The NCP sets forth an extensive list of remedial actions that 
generally are appropriate for addressing the types of situations that 
arise at sites requiring such actions. 58 Included in this list are tech-
niques for removing and treating contaminated soil, sediment or 
waste; containing or restoring contaminated groundwater; control-
ling or remediating surface water; and providing alternative water 
supplies. 59 
Establishing the consistency of a removal or remedial action with 
the relevant NCP requirements has been a contentious issue in much 
recent private cost recovery litigation. 60 CERCLA distinguishes the 
determination of consistency with NCP requirements in actions to 
recover costs filed by the federal government, a state, or an Indian 
tribe from the determination of consistency in actions filed by "any 
other person. "61 When the federal government or a state acts, the 
burden is on the defendant to prove that the removal or remedial 
action undertaken is inconsistent with the NCP.62 In contrast, when 
56 Id. § 300.430. An RI collects data necessary to characterize the site, in order to develop 
and evaluate effective remedial alternatives. Id. An FS ensures the development and evalu-
ation of appropriate remedial alternatives. Id. 
57 Id. § 300.435. 
68 Id. § 300 app. D. 
59 Id. 
60 Courts require a full factual record to determine consistency. See Amland Properties 
Corp. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 711 F. Supp. 784, 794 (D. N.J. 1988); Artesian Water Co. v. 
New Castle County, 605 F. Supp. 1348, 1356 (D. DeL 1985), aJJ'd, 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1988); 
Pinole Point Properties, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F. Supp. 283, 290 (N.D. Cal. 
1984). 
In the absence of a full factual record, a plaintiff can seek a declaratory judgment on the 
defendant's liability for future consistent response costs. See Southland Corp. v. Ashland Oil 
Inc., 696 F. Supp. 994, 999 (D. N.J. 1988); T & E Indus. v. Safety Light Corp., 680 F. Supp. 
696, 708-09 (D. N.J. 1988); Sunnen Products Co. v. Chemtech Indus., 658 F. Supp. 276, 278 
(E.D. Mo. 1987); Jones, 584 F. Supp. at 1430; see also Velsicol Chern. Corp., v. Reilly Tar & 
Chern. Corp., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2118,2118 (E.D. Tenn. 1984) (court refused defen-
dant's motion to strike plaintiff's request for declaratory judgment). Consequently, one strat-
egy that a plaintiff may pursue is to incur a minimal amount of response costs and then obtain 
a judgment regarding the defendant's liability. This judgment may yield a favorable settlement 
or allow the plaintiff to focus its resources on ensuring a consistent response. See Daniel M. 
Steinway, Private Cost Recovery Actions: What is the Impact oj the Consistency Require-
ments? 20 Envt'l Rep. (BNA) 1947, 1948 (1990). 
The issue of consistency has been the subject of much litigation. See, e.g., Channel Master 
Satellite Sys., Inc. v. JFD Elecs. Corp., 748 F. Supp. 373 (E.D.N.C. 1990); BCW Assocs., 
Ltd. v. Occidental Chern. Corp., No. 86-5974, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11275, at *46 (E.D. Pa. 
September 30, 1988); Amland, 711 F. Supp. at 793-801; Versatile Metals, Inc. v. Union Corp., 
693 F. Supp. 1563, 1581 (E.D. Pa. 1988); Artesian Water Co., 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1294-97. 
61 42 U.S.C § 9607(a)(4)(A)-(B) (1988). 
62 Philadelphia v. Stepan Chern. Co., 713 F. Supp. 1484, 1486 (E.D. Pa. 1989). 
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"any other person" seeks to recover costs, there is no presumption 
of consistency with the NCP.63 Rather, a private party must prove 
consistency with the NCP as an element in its prima facie case, 
frequently leading to litigation on this point. 64 
III. THE NATIONAL CONTINGENCY PLAN 
A. The 1982 NCP and the 1985 Revisions 
The NCP, created in 1968 as the Multi-Agency Oil and Hazardous 
Material Contingency Plan, fulfilled a presidential order to study the 
federal government's plans for responding to environmental disas-
ters and, in particular, to oil spills. 65 CERCLA required the Presi-
dent to revise the NCP to reflect and facilitate CERCLA's goals. 66 
Following CERCLA's enactment in 1980, the President delegated 
responsibility for revising the NCP to the EPA.67 Pursuant to CER-
CLA's mandate to establish procedures and standards for responding 
to releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants, 
the EPA's revisions dramatically expanded the NCP.68 
The EPA released the revised NCP in July 1982.69 The 1982 NCP 
emphasized the following goals: state participation; conservation of 
Superfund monies through private party action; sensitivity to local 
opinion; reliance on established technology where practical and cost-
effective; and industry and expert participation and technology shar-
ing. 70 It did not contain a separate provision addressing private 
parties' obligations in cleanup actions; private party cleanups were 
expected to comply with the requirements governing all response 
actions. 71 
The 1982 NCP did not provide CERCLA cleanup standards. 72 The 
state of New Jersey and the Environmental Defense Fund chal-
63 Id. 
64 See, e.g., ClULnnel Master Satellite Sys., Inc., 748 F. Supp. at 387-92; General Elec. Co. 
v. Litton Business Sys., 715 F. Supp. 949, 959-62 (W.D. Mo. 1989), a/I'd, 920 F.2d 1415 (8th 
Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 1390 (1991); County Line Inv. Co. v. Tinney, 30 Env't Rep. 
Cas. (BNA) 1062, 1063 (N.D. Okla. 1989). 
66 See Joseph Freedman, Proposed Amendments to the National Contingency Plan: Ex-
planation and Analysis, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,103, 10,105 (1989). 
66 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a) (1988). 
67 See Freedman, supra note 65, at 10,107. 
68 See 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1988) (CERCLA's requirements for revision of NCP). 
69 See Freedman, supra note 65, at 10,107 (citing National Oil and Hazardous Substances 
Pollution Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R. § 300.61(c) (1983». 
70 [d. at 10,108. 
71 See Versatile Metals, Inc. v. Union Corp., 693 F. Supp. 1563, 1575 (E.D. Pa. 1988). 
72 Freedman, supra note 65, at 10,109. 
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lenged this shortcoming in federal court.73 Their actions resulted in 
a settlement in which the EPA agreed either to amend the NCP so 
that it incorporated relevant health and environmental standards 
from other EPA programs to serve as standards for CERCLA rem-
edies, or to provide an explanation if the NCP did not include such 
standards. 74 
In November 1985, the EPA promulgated revisions to the NCP.75 
To fulfill the terms of the settlement agreement, the EPA included 
a provision that looks to the requirements of other federal environ-
mental laws in order to establish a standard for remedial cleanup. 76 
This standard is known as the "applicable or relevant and appropri-
ate requirement" (ARAR) standard. 77 The ARAR standard, as well 
as many of the other major changes promulgated in the 1985 NCP, 
were contained in a subpart of the Code of Federal Regulations 
entitled "Hazardous Substances Response. "78 This subpart also in-
cluded provisions that established methods and criteria for deter-
mining the extent of government and private party response that 
CERCLA authorized. 79 
Under the 1982 NCP, courts had split over whether prior EPA 
approval of a private party's cleanup plan was necessary for the 
party to recover the costs of implementing the plan. 80 The 1985 NCP, 
however, specifically did not require prior EPA approval for private 
party recovery.81 Instead, in order to ensure that its response costs 
would be consistent with the NCP, a private party had to study the 
site in question, develop a set of alternative cleanup strategies and 
73 [d. (citing Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, No. 82-2234 (D.C. Cir. 1982); New 
Jersey v. EPA, No. 82-2238 (D.C. Cir. 1982». 
74 [d. 
76 [d. 
76 [d. 
77 [d. Generally, "applicable" requirements are promulgated under federal or state envi-
ronmental regimes and would be legally applied except for CERCLA's implied preemption of 
other laws. [d.; see also National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 
40 C.F.R. § 300.5 (1990). "Relevant and appropriate" requirements are not specifically appli-
cable, but they apply to conditions similar enough to those found at CERCLA sites that their 
application is appropriate in CERCLA cleanups. [d. 
78 National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan 40 C.F.R. § 300.61-
.71 (1989). 
79 [d. 
80 Compare Pinole Point Properties, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F. Supp. 283, 290 
(N.D. Cal. 1984) (recovery of costs does not necessitate prior EPA approval) with Bulk Dist. 
Ctrs., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1444 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (recovery of costs 
necessitates prior EPA approval); see also Freedman, supra note 65, at 10,112 nn.95-96. 
81 See National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R. 
§ 300.71 (1989). 
1991] CONSISTENCY UNDER THE 1990 NCP 227 
select a cleanup plan from these alternatives, and provide for a public 
comment period on the remedial site it selected.82 
B. Consistency and the 1985 NCP 
Many courts addressing the issues of private cost recovery and 
consistency with the 1985 NCP applied the requirements of the NCP 
with rigor.83 These decisions followed the general rationale that 
CERCLA is a narrowly-drawn remedy that is limited to necessary 
response costs. 84 
Consistency with the NCP is an essential element to a private 
party's claim under CERCLA.85 The plaintiff in Channel Master 
Satellite Systems, Inc. v. JFD Electronics COrp.86 sought to recover 
costs for the cleanup of a surface impoundment, or sludge lagoon, 
and soil contaminated by volatile organic compounds. 87 The hazard-
ous waste contamination was in large part due to the defendant's 
use of the facilities to manufacture television antennae between 1968 
and 1979.88 Channel Master claimed to have incurred over $3.9 mil-
lion in its cleanup effort, excluding its attorneys' fees. 89 On the 
82 See id. 
83 See BCW Assocs., Ltd. v. Occidental Chern. Corp., No. 86-5974, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
11275, at *55 (E.D. Pa. September 30, 1988) (while court need not follow NCP in "Procrustean 
manner," compliance also is not "reducible to an inquiry into whether the cleanup was cost 
efficient and environmentally sound"); see also County Line Inv. Co. v. Tinney, 30 Env't Rep. 
Cas. (BNA) 1062, 1063 (N.D. Okla. 1989) (plaintiff not permitted to recover costs where no 
opportunity for public comment provided and remedial study standards not followed); Amland 
Properties Corp. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 711 F. Supp. 784, 797 (D.N.J. 1989) (private party 
responses consistent with NCP ''if they adhere to the specific requirements ofthe NCP, absent 
a showing that one or more of those requirements are inappropriate under the circumstances"); 
Versatile Metals, Inc. v. Union Corp., 693 F. Supp. 1563, 1576 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (failure to 
assess site according to remedial requirements of NCP in remedial action is a barrier to 
recovery of response costs); Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269, 
1294 (D. Del. 1985), a/I'd, 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1988) (failure to follow NCP requirements 
strictly in remedial action precludes cost recovery). But see General Elec. Co. v. Litton 
Business Sys., 715 F. Supp. 949, 959-62 (W.D. Mo. 1989), aff'd, 920 F.2d 1415 (8th Cir. 1990), 
em. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1390 (1991) (consistency with NCP does not necessitate strict compli-
ance with its provisions). 
84 See Artesian Water Co., 659 F. Supp. at 1299. The Artesian court noted that "limiting 
recovery of the costs ... ensures that responsible parties will be liable under CERCLA only 
for the necessary costs of response .... Congress did not intend for CERCLA, a narrowly 
drawn federal remedy, to make injured parties whole or to be the general vehicle for toxic 
tort actions." I d. . 
B5 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988); see also Artesian Water, 659 F. Supp. at 1278-79. 
B6 748 F. Supp. 373 (E.D.N.C. 1990). 
87 Id. at 376. 
B8 Id. 
so Id. 
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defendant's motion for summary judgment, however, the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina held 
that Channel Master completely failed to demonstrate consistency 
with the NCP, and denied any recovery. 90 
Despite Channel Master's knowledge of the NCP, it did not consult 
or abide by any NCP provisions in its cleanup.91 Consequently, even 
if the cleanup effort, a remedial action subject to detailed NCP 
provisions, was characterized as a removal action subject to less 
stringent NCP requirements, it would have failed to achieve consis-
tency with the NCP.92 According to the court, private party response 
actions must adhere to the regulatory scheme prescribed by the 
NCP, because Congress deemed consistency with the NCP to be 
more important than making CERCLA an unlimited mechanism for 
recovery. 93 
In Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle County,94 the United States 
District Court for the District of Delaware applied the requirements 
of the NCP strictly to a private cleanup.95 The court granted defen-
dant New Castle County's motion for partial summary judgment, 
because it found that many of Artesian Water Co.'s response costs 
were inconsistent with the NCP's procedural and substantive re-
quirements. 96 Specifically, the court pointed to Artesian Water Co.'s 
failure to achieve consistency in three areas. 97 First, it rejected the 
company's attempt to substitute its own study for the NCP-man-
dated RIIFS.98 Artesian Water Co.'s substitute RIIFS failed, be-
cause it did not contain the necessary evaluation of alternatives for 
remedying the hazardous substance releases at the site. 99 Second, 
the court rejected Artesian Water Co.'s assertions that its chosen 
water replacement method was the most cost-effective means of 
water resupply.l°O The court noted that the NCP required water 
replacement to be cost-effective relative to other means of remedy-
ing the contamination at a site. 101 
00 Id. at 395-96. 
91 Id. at 394. 
92 Id. at 390-92. 
93 Id. at 393-94 (citing Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1299-
1300 (D. Del. 1985), aff'd, 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1988». 
94 659 F. Supp. 1269 (D. Del. 1985), aff'd, 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1988). 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 1299. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 1296. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 1297. 
101 Id. CERCLA provides that the NCP shall include "means of assuring that remedial 
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Third, according to the court, Artesian Water Co. did not comply 
with all otherwise applicable or relevant and appropriate federal, 
state, and local requirements. 102 The court pointed out that the 
ARAR standard was intended, in part, as a substitute for prior 
government approval of response actions, because the standard de-
ters poor-quality cleanups and reduces the possibility of concurrent, 
independent response actions by the government and a private 
party.103 Only Artesian Water Co.' s monitoring and evaluation costs 
were consistent with the NCP, according to the court, because the 
detailed provisions of the NCP governing remedial actions were not 
applicable to these costs. 104 
Following the Artesian court's position, the United States District 
Court for the District of New Jersey in Amland Properties Corp. v. 
Aluminum Co. of America105 rejected the plaintiff's proposed stan-
dard of substantial compliance with the NCP to demonstrate consis-
tency.106 The court stated that private party response actions are 
consistent with the NCP if they adhere to the specific requirements 
of the NCP, unless there is a demonstration that one or more of 
those requirements is inappropriate under the circumstances. 107 In 
Amland, the plaintiff had failed to comply with certain procedural 
requirements of the NCP, including the RIIFS and public comment 
requirements.108 It also was unable to show that its failures were 
exonerated by any unique circumstances that rendered the require-
ments inapplicable to the site. 109 The court buttressed its reliance 
on precedentllO with remarks extracted from the preamble to the 
1985 NCP.111 Consequently, as in the Artesian decision, the court 
action measures are cost-effective over the period of potential exposure to the hazardous 
substances or contaminated materials." 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1988); see also National Oil and 
Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R. 300.71(a)(2)(ii)(C) (1989). 
102 Artesian, 659 F. Supp. at 1296-97 (citing National Oil and Hazardous Substances 
Pollution Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R. 300.71(a)(4) (1989». 
103 I d. at 1296. 
104 Id. at 1299. 
106 711 F. Supp. 784 (D.N.J. 1989). 
106 I d. at 796. 
107 Id. at 797. 
lOS Id. at 799-801. 
109 Id. at 801. 
110 Id. (citing Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269 (D. Del. 1985), 
aff'd, 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1988); Versatile Metals, Inc. v. Union Corp., 693 F. Supp. 1563 
(E.D. Pa. 1988); BCW Assocs., Ltd. v. Occidental Chern. Corp., No. 86-5974, 1988 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 11275 (E.D. Pa. September 30, 1988». 
III Id. at 796 ("EPA has modified § 300.71 to specify in detail what private parties must do 
in order to act consistently with the NCP"). 
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awarded to the plaintiff only its preliminary monitoring costs, which 
were not governed by the detailed NCP remedial provisions. l12 
Not every court addressing the issues of private cost recovery and 
consistency with the 1985 NCP has applied the NCP requirements 
so strictly. Emphasizing Congress's desire to induce voluntary, ap-
propriate response actions at inactive hazardous waste sites through 
CERCLA, the United States District Court for the District of Mis-
souri reasoned in General Electric Co. v. Litton Business Systemsl13 
that the requirement of consistency with the NCP does not neces-
sitate strict compliance with NCP provisions. l14 Citing to the pream-
ble of the 1985 NCP, the court characterized the NCP as a general 
plan or framework that is not intended to provide complex, detailed, 
site-specific decisionmaking criteria. l15 Litton, the defendant, ar-
gued that General Electric had not complied with the guidelines for 
a remedial action on the grounds that it had not provided a public 
comment period. l16 The court concluded, however, that the plaintiff's 
overall response effort was consistent as a removal action.117 The 
failure to provide for a public comment period and give notice with 
respect to the cleanup efforts was not fatal to its recovery action. l18 
In other words, General Electric's compliance with the applicable 
and relevant or appropriate state requirements, and the input of a 
state agency-the Missouri Department of Natural Resources-into 
the remedy selection process, together served as an effective sub-
stitute for fulfilling the NCP's public comment and notice require-
ments. l19 Thus, when viewed in light of their overall adherence to 
the NCP's provisions, the plaintiff's actions were consistent with 
the NCP.120 
112 I d. at 795. 
113 715 F. Supp. 949 (W.D. Mo. 1989), a/I'd, 920 F.2d 1415 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 
111 S. Ct. 1390 (1991). 
114 Id. at 962. The decision relies upon N.L. Industries, Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898-
99 (9th Cir. 1986) (consistency with NCP does not necessitate strict compliance with its 
provisions). N.L. Industries relied on Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 
890 (9th Cir. 1986) (compliance with the NCP does not require prior government approval for 
recovery). 
116 General Elec. Co., 715 F. Supp. at 959 (citing National Oil and Hazardous Substances 
Pollution Contingency Plan, 50 Fed. Reg. 47912, 47,920 (1985». 
116 Id. at 961. 
117 Id. at 960. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 963. 
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IV. THE NCP SINCE 1985 
A. SARA and the NCP 
President Reagan signed amendments to CERCLA, the Super-
fund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), in Oc-
tober 1986. 121 In addition to providing the Superfund with an addi-
tional $8.5 billion, SARA required a revision of the NCP.122 
Specifically, the statute required the revision of the procedures and 
standards for remedial actions. 123 Goals related to the selection of 
appropriate remedial actions and intended to be addressed in the 
new NCP included cost-effective remedy selection;124 protection of 
human health and the environment;125 utilization of permanent rem-
edies as well as alternative treatment and resource recovery tech-
nologies, to the maximum extent possible;126 substantial and mean-
ingful state participation in the initiation and development of 
remedial actions;127 and increased public participation. l28 Overall, 
SARA provided statutory directives for the NCP that were complex 
and, to a certain degree, inherently irreconcilable. l29 At the least, 
the statute caused the EPA a great deal of difficulty in prescribing 
rules that should apply to all sites. 130 
B. The 1990 NCP 
The 1990 NCP represents both the EPA's effort to implement 
SARA's policies and an agency-initiated effort to rework the 1985 
121 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 
1613 (1986). 
122 42 U.S.C. § 9605(b) (1988). For a general discussion of SARA, see Timothy B. Atkinson 
et aI., An Annotated Legislative History of the Supe1j"und Amendments and Reauthorization 
Act of 1986 (SARA), 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,360 (1986). 
123 42 U.S.C. § 9605(b) (1988). 
124 [d. § 9621(a), (b)(l). 
125 [d. § 9621(b). 
126 [d. 
127 [d. § 9621(0. 
126 [d. § 9617. See also Lawrence E. Starfield, The 1990 National Contingency Plan-More 
Detail and More Structure, But Still a Balancing Act, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 
10,222, 10,227 (1990). 
129 See, e.g., Starfield, supra note 128, at 10,227. The EPA is directed to maximize treatment 
and ensure a cost-effective remedy. [d. Presumably, the tension is created by the necessity 
of determining at what point costs outweigh marginal benefits. 
130 See id. 
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NCP.131 The EPA's failure to promulgate a revised NCP by SARA's 
statutory deadline of April 17, 1988 may be due to the magnitude of 
this effort.132 Because of this failure, several environmental groups 
sued the EPA in the fall of 1988, and a subsequent consent decree 
resulted in a timetable for the publication of the new NCP.133 The 
final rule embodying the 1990 NCp· appeared in the March 8, 1990 
Federal Register. 134 
The 1990 NCP is composed of ten subparts.135 Subpart H, entitled 
"Participation by Other Persons," addresses consistency of private 
party actions with the NCP.136 The proposed rule had provided a list 
of mandatory NCP provisions. 137 For a private party cleanup to be 
consistent with the NCP, the party seeking recovery would have to 
have followed these provisions to the extent that they were pertinent 
to the cleanup.138 The final rule, however, did not include these 
requirements. 139 Under the final rule, a private party cleanup is 
consistent with the NCP if, when evaluated as a whole, it substan-
tially has complied with the potentially applicable NCP requirements 
and is what the EPA terms a "CERCLA-quality cleanup."14o A 
131 See id. 
132 See id. 
133 See id. 
134 National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan-Final Rule, 55 Fed. 
Reg. 8666 (1990). Revisions first were proposed in the Federal Register on December 21, 
1988. National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan-Proposed Rule, 53 
Fed. Reg. 51,461 (1988). 
136 National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan 40 C.F.R. § 300 
(1990). 
136 [d. at § 300.700. 
137 National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan-Proposed Rule, 53 
Fed. Reg. 51,394, 51,461 (1988). 
138 [d. The proposed list included provisions regarding the following issues: worker health 
and safety; documentation and cost recovery; the need for Superfund-financed actions; permit 
requirements; identification of ARARs; reports of releases to the National Response Center; 
removal site evaluation; removal actions; remedial site evaluation; remedial studies and selec-
tion of remedy; remedial design and action; and remedy operation and maintenance. Specific 
exceptions, which apply only to government actions, were made for those provisions. [d. 
139 [d. 
140 55 Fed. Reg. 8666, 8793 (1990). The 1990 NCP states that the "EPA's decision to require 
only 'substantial' compliance with potentially applicable requirements is based, in large part, 
on the recognition that providing a list of rigid requirements may serve to defeat cost recovery 
for meritorious cleanup actions based on a mere technical failure by the private party that 
has taken the response action." [d. 
The potentially applicable NCP requirements closely parallel the proposed mandatory re-
quirements. They include general provisions that cover the following topics: worker health 
and safety; documentation and cost recovery; the need for Superfund-financed actions; permit 
requirements; identification of and compliance with ARARs; reports of releases to the National 
Response Center; site evaluation for removal action; remedial site evaluation; remedial site 
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CERCLA-quality cleanup protects human health and the environ-
ment, utilizes permanent solutions and alternative technologies to 
the maximum extent practicable, and is cost-effective. 141 The fulfill-
ment of these requirements is necessary to achieve a CERCLA-
quality cleanup. 142 
The EPA expects that the 1990 NCP will encourage private parties 
to perform voluntary cleanups, because the new final rule removes 
unnecessary obstacles to recovering costs from liable parties. 143 
Moreover, by establishing a standard to measure the quality of 
cleanups under CERCLA, the EPA expects to encourage only ef-
fective cleanup efforts. 144 
The substantial compliance standard promotes two EPA goals. It 
responds to concerns about the effect that a requirement of "rigid 
adherence to a detailed set of procedures" would have on the ability 
of private parties to recover their cleanup costs. 145 Additionally, the 
CERCLA-quality cleanup standard aims to guarantee that a private 
right of action be available only for cleanups that are, in the eyes of 
the agency, "environmentally sound. "146 
The EPA decided to require substantial compliance with the NCP, 
rather than strict compliance, because it believed that enforcing a 
strict compliance standard would result in the disallowance of cost 
recovery in otherwise successful cleanup actions due to failures to 
comply with mere technicalities. 147 A substantial compliance stan-
dard, on the other hand, accommodates the limited experience of 
private parties in performing hazardous waste cleanups and gives 
voice to the agency's belief that harmless mistakes based on such 
inexperience should not be the basis for rejecting a private party's 
cost recovery claim. 148 According to the EPA, allowing "de minimus" 
investigations and feasibility studies (RIs/FSs) and selection of remedies; remedial designs 
and remedial actions (RDs/RAs); remedy operation and maintenance; and opportunity for 
public comment. National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 40 
C.F.R. § 3oo.7oo(c)(5)-(7) (1990); see supra note 138 for a comparison between the proposed 
and final rules. 
141 National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 55 Fed. Reg. 8666, 
8793 (1990) (preamble to private party requirements under 1990 NCP). 
142 [d. 
143 See id. at 8792-93. 
144 See id. at 8793. 
146 [d. 
146 [d. 
147 [d. The EPA uses the example of the failure of a private party to provide a public 
hearing. [d. According to the agency, this failure should not defeat recovery if the public was 
afforded ample opportunity for comment. [d. 
148 See id. 
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or "harmless deviations" from certain NCP provisions accords with 
the "longstanding judicial principles of harmless error and materi-
ality."149 Accordingly, the EPA sets forth a "universe of require-
ments" that are "potentially relevant to private party actions. "150 
The agency does not view this list of requirements as carved in 
stone. 151 
Awarding costs to private parties if they demonstrate that a 
cleanup substantially complied with NCP provisions and accom-
plished a CERCLA-quality cleanup is left to the courts, as before, 
for determination on a case-by-case basis.152 The preamble to the 
1990 NCP notes that a private party may eliminate any risk or 
uncertainty with respect to compliance with the NCP by meeting all 
of the potentially relevant requirements that the EPA has set 
forth. 153 Thus, the courts are the final authority in measuring parties' 
efforts under the 1990 NCP, a plan that the EPA itself has charac-
terized as pursuing the divergent goals of promoting private party 
efforts while also insuring a high standard of cleanup. 154 
V. A CLOSER LOOK AT COMPLIANCE WITH THE NCP 
Under CERCLA, private parties are not necessarily obligated to 
perform hazardous waste cleanups.155 Instead, CERCLA creates an 
incentive for voluntary private cleanups by allowing for reimburse-
ment from responsible parties. 156 Given the dimension of the hazard-
149 Id. at 8794. 
160 Id. at 8793. 
161 Id. 
162 See id. at 8794. 
163 Id. at 8794; see also National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 
40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c)(5)-(7) (1990) (full set of potentially relevant requirements). 
164 Id. at 8792-93. 
166 See Steinway, supra note 60, at 1947. Voluntary private party cleanups and subsequent 
private cost recovery actions often fall into three situations where there is a benefit to the 
litigant. First, a current owner of contaminated property who can be held liable to the state 
or federal government for all the cleanup costs under CERCLA or a state analogue may 
proceed individually with cleanup and then sue other PRPs under CERCLA for contribution. 
Id. In this manner, the current owner avoids the cost and uncertainty of litigating the issue 
of liability against the government. Id. Second, if there is no immediate threat of government 
enforcement or liability, and contamination is incompatible with the planned use for the 
property, an owner not responsible for the contamination may choose to voluntarily engage 
in cleanup and then sue other PRPs. Id. Third, owners of property not contaminated by 
hazardous waste nevertheless may be threatened by releases of hazardous waste, and there-
fore voluntarily engage in cleanup in the absence of an impending enforcement action by the 
government or cleanup by another private party. Id. 
166 See supra notes 13-64 and accompanying text. 
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ous waste problem, Congress recognized the need to place the bur-
den of cleanup on responsible parties. 157 
The 1990 NCP's standard for consistency, substantial compliance 
with the NCP and completion of a CERCLA-quality cleanup, pur-
ports to be a departure from the judicially derived standards that 
existed under the 1985 NCP.l58 The EPA has asserted that the 1990 
NCP will encourage more private party cleanup actions, without 
detracting from the quality of these actions, by allowing increased 
flexibility.159 Closer scrutiny of the new private party requirements 
reveals, however, that the 1990 NCP does not necessarily contain 
any dramatic new incentive for private parties to engage in hazard-
ous waste cleanup.160 Rather, the 1990 NCP clarifies the standard 
that courts should apply in assessing private party response actions 
and thereby decreases defendants' ability to use judicial disagree-
ment surrounding the NCP to their advantage when litigating the 
issue of consistency.161 From this perspective, the 1990 NCP will 
promote private party cleanup. 
A. Standards of Consistency Compared 
The definition of strict compliance under the 1985 NCP, as ex-
pressed in Amland, provides some flexibility for private party re-
sponse actions. 162 The Amland court reasoned that a private party's 
response action was consistent with the NCP if the cleanup followed 
the requirements of the NCP, unless the party explained why a 
specific requirement was inappropriate to its cleanup. 163 Thus, under 
the Amland view of the 1985 NCP, private parties had to follow 
NCP provisions, where appropriate, to recover costS. l64 
The General Electric court purported to relax the strict compli-
ance standard developed in Amland and its predecessors, by apply-
ing a substantial compliance standard to private party response 
actions. 165 The court reasoned that no public hearing was required, 
because General Electric complied with all legally applicable or rel-
157 H.R. Rep. No. 253, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 79 (1986), reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N., 2835, 2836. 
158 See supra notes 140--51 and accompanying text. 
159 See id. 
160 See id. 
161 See supra notes 83-120 and accompanying text. 
162 See supra notes 105-12 and accompanying text. 
163 Amland Properties Corp. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 711 F. Supp. 784, 797 (D.N.J. 1989). 
164 [d. 
165 See supra notes 113-20 and accompanying text. 
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evant and appropriate state requirements related to the cleanup in 
question. Moreover, according to the court, if notice to the public 
was a requirement, the input of the Missouri Department of Natural 
Resources served as a sufficient substitute. l66 The General Electric 
court concluded that neither EPA approval nor a listing on the 
National Priorities List, the official list of Superfund sites in the 
United States, is a prerequisite for a private party's recovery of its 
response costS. 167 The court noted, however, that the 1985 NCP 
never required that federal approval precede either a private party 
cleanup action or any subsequent cost recovery action. 168 
The Channel Master court, in assessing a response action per-
formed under the 1985 NCP after the General Electric decision, 
acknowledged that both a strict and a liberal standard exist to de-
termine consistency with the NCP.169 But, as the court pointed out, 
the broad language of the substantial compliance standard applied 
in General Electric was tied to narrow facts.17o General Electric, 
then, did not constitute a' broad invitation to construe NCP provi-
sions liberally. 
The distinction between the Amland court's requirement of strict 
compliance and the General Electric court's substantial compliance 
standard is not necessarily great. Both require the party seeking 
recovery of its costs to demonstrate specific circumstances that jus-
tify its deviating from the NCP while still recovering cleanup costs. 
The true effect of the apparent difference between the two standards 
may be to inject an element of confusion and uncertainty into private 
party actions by seemingly creating two approaches to defining con-
sistency with the 1985 NCP. 
The NCP revisions proposed in 1988 were designed to enhance 
the probability of a successful recovery and encourage private party 
actions.l7l They would have mandated compliance with a list of NCP 
provisions on the basis of each provision's appropriateness at a site, 
thereby providing a standard similar to that established by the 
Amland court. 172 Establishing substantial compliance under the 1990 
166 General Elec. Co. v. Litton Business Sys., 715 F. Supp. 949, 959--62 (W.D. Mo. 1989), 
afl'd, 920 F.2d 1415 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1390 (1991). 
167 [d. at 959. 
168 [d. at 962. 
169 Channel Master Satellite Sys., Inc. v. JFD Elecs. Corp., 748 F. Supp. 373, 383 (E.D.N.C. 
1990). 
170 [d. 
171 See supra notes 140-51 and accompanying text. 
172 See supra notes 137-90 and accompanying text. 
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NCP involves fulfilling a diverse set of potentially applicable require-
ments and, from the perspective of encouraging voluntary private 
party cleanups, may not represent a dramatic departure from the 
Amland court's standard under the 1985 NCP or even the NCP 
proposed in 1988.173 
Uncertainty and risk remain for the private party contemplating 
voluntary cleanup and a subsequent cost recovery action under the 
1990 NCP.174 Ultimately, consistency with the NCP is not deter-
mined until a private party incurs cleanup costS. 175 Because CER-
CLA places the burden of proving consistency upon the party who 
engages in cleanup, that party risks having its costs ruled inconsis-
tent with the NCP.176 The 1990 NCP does not resolve this dilemma, 
because the differing burdens are mandated by statute.177 Further, 
the 1990 NCP potentially perpetuates an additional element of un-
certainty in this equation. Under the 1990 NCP, a court must con-
sider both the universe of potentially applicable requirements and 
the quality of the cleanup effort in determining whether to award 
cleanup costs. 178 Given both the 1990 NCP's cleanup requirements 
and the judicial view that the most important factor in a response 
action is the ultimate effectiveness of the cleanup,179 courts may be 
tempted to limit the parameters of substantial compliance to ensure 
that the quality of cleanup efforts remains as high as possible. Simply 
put, under the 1990 NCP, as before, private parties can not neces-
sarily gauge how rigidly a given court will apply the applicable 
requirements set forth by the EPA until after a cleanup has been 
completed. 
Because consistency with the NCP is subject to challenge before 
courts award full cleanup costs, private parties wishing to avoid 
uncertainty and risk will be inclined to follow the full set of poten-
tially relevant requirements to minimize the possibility of having 
costs ruled inconsistent with the NCP. Given the enormous costs 
involved in hazardous waste cleanup efforts, private parties contem-
plating voluntary cleanup efforts under the 1990 NCP may not view 
173 See supra notes 140-51 and accompanying text. 
174 For a discussion of the issues of uncertainty and consistency with the NCP and other 
disincentives under CERCLA on private party cost recovery actions, see Gaba, supra note 
36, at 224. 
175 See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text. 
176 See id. 
177 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). 
178 See supra notes 140-51 and accompanying text. 
179 Versatile Metals v. Union Corp., 693 F. Supp. 1563, 1579 (E.n. Pa. 1988). 
238 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 19:217 
the substantial compliance standard as a great departure from the 
previous standard of strict compliance. Decisions by an individual 
party about whether to engage in a cleanup effort now will differ 
little from decisions made under the previous standard of strict 
compliance. Prudence and self-interest dictate that a private party 
only undertake the expense of voluntary cleanup if there is a rea-
sonably certain prospect of recovering costs from the other PRPs at 
the site. 
EPA dismisses the element of uncertainty in voluntary cleanups 
by inviting private parties to follow the full set of potentially relevant 
requirements. 18o In effect, this means private parties can only be 
objectively certain that their cleanups will be held consistent if they 
treat the potentially applicable requirements as mandatory. In this 
respect, the 1990 NCP's substantial compliance standard does not 
provide dramatic new incentive for private parties to engage in 
voluntary cleanup when compared with the prior or the proposed 
requirements. No party can be certain that any deviation from the 
NCP other than ones previously either litigated or approved by the 
EPA will be considered to be de minimus by a court. The true effect 
of the 1990 NCP therefore may simply be that it clarifies the appar-
ent disagreement between the circuits as to the proper standard to 
apply in determining consistency. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Encouraging private party cleanup of hazardous waste sites by 
responsible parties is an essential goal of CERCLA.181 The 1990 
NCP's standard for consistency-substantial compliance and a CER-
CLA-quality cleanup--will promote this goal. The flexibility that the 
substantial compliance standard purports to inject into private party 
response actions is, however, limited. The true incentive the 1990 
NCP's substantial compliance standard provides is that it resolves 
the conflict, which existed among the courts under the 1985 NCP, 
over defining consistency. Furthermore, the new standard removes 
the ability of defendants to exploit this conflict and escape respon-
sibility for cleanup costs. Overall, this development should promote 
the continued growth of private party cleanup, which is essential if 
the hazardous waste problem is to be cured. 
180 See supra notes 150--53 and accompanying text. 
181 See supra notes 3-9 and accompanying text. 
